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Chapter 5  
 
 
The Impact of Bank Ownership Concentration on 
Impaired Loans and Capital Adequacy 1 
 
5.1 Introduction  
How does concentrated ownership affect bank riskiness? The corporate finance literature 
comes up with different answers to this question. According to Berle and Means (1933), 
dispersed ownership reduces the effective power of shareholders to control the 
management of the firm. Similarly, Shleifer and Vishny (1986) argue that ownership 
concentration enhances corporate control by improving the monitoring of management. 
With diffused ownership, shareholders have little incentives to monitor. With 
concentrated ownership, the cost of shirking will be mostly borne by large shareholders 
who therefore have a strong incentive to monitor the firm’s management.  
However, other studies suggest that ownership concentration may not reduce bank 
riskiness. For example, Burkart et al. (1997) argue that tight outside ownership 
constitutes an expropriation threat that reduces managerial initiatives and non-
contractible investments. According to Gomes and Novaes (1999, 2005), large 
shareholders can have interests that are different from those of minority shareholders. 
                                                 
1
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Moreover, the bargaining problems due to the presence of multiple controlling 
shareholders may prevent efficient decision-making. Demsetz and Lehen (1985) argue 
that in heavily regulated industries, such as the financial sector, regulation leads to more 
effective disciplining of managers. This, in turn, reduces the potential benefits of 
ownership control.  
In this chapter, we test the traditional Berle-Means position that ownership 
concentration improves banking firm performance against the view that ownership 
concentration does not matter for banks’ riskiness, using non-performing loans and 
capital adequacy as indicators of riskiness.2 There are two important issues that have to 
be taken into account when testing these competing hypotheses in the context of the 
banking industry: the protection of minority shareholders and the protection of deposit 
holders.  
If minority shareholders are hardly protected they may be unable to exert effective 
control over management (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). La Porta et al. (1998) report that 
for non-financial firms concentration of ownership is negatively related to investor 
protection. This is consistent with the hypothesis that small, diversified shareholders are 
unlikely to be important in countries that fail to protect their rights. Therefore, we need to 
take shareholder protection rules into account in our empirical model.  
In addition, we have to take an important difference between a non-financial firm 
and a banking firm into account. The difference being that banks have depositors and 
non-financial firms do not. Consequently, bank shareholders may collude with managers 
against deposit holders to extend high-risk loans, which may result in a high level of 
impaired loans and inadequate bank capital (Boyd et al., 1998). To some extent, 
supervisory authorities act as the representative of deposit holders and safeguard their 
interests, while deposit insurance schemes protect the wealth of deposit holders. 
However, these deposit insurance schemes can reduce market discipline (Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Detragiache, 2002; Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2004). Moral hazard problems 
may arise as bank managers and owners do not bear the full consequences of their 
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 Surprisingly, only few studies examine the effect of ownership concentration on bank riskiness. In a recent study, 
Iannotta et al. (2007) compare the performance and risk of a sample of 181 large banks from 15 European countries 
and report that ownership concentration is associated with better loan quality, lower asset risk, and lower insolvency 
risk.  
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actions. Consequently, supervisory agencies will want to keep a check on bank policies.3 
Therefore, we need to incorporate the role of supervisory agencies and deposit insurance 
regulation into our empirical model.  
We analyze data for around 500 banks from more than 50 countries averaged over 
2005-2007. We examine whether ownership concentration (i) improves risk-weighted 
capital adequacy ratios through better risk-taking policies by management, and (ii) 
decreases the impaired loans to gross loans ratio by reducing the potential moral hazard 
problem. We find that concentrated ownership significantly reduces a bank’s non-
performing loans ratio, conditional on supervisory control and shareholders protection 
rights. Furthermore, ownership concentration improves the capital adequacy ratio 
conditional on the extent of shareholder protection.  
There are two papers that are related to our study. Caprio et al. (2007) assess the 
impact of ownership structure of banks and shareholders protection laws on bank 
valuation using data on 244 banks in 44 countries. They find that ownership structure is 
an important mechanism for governing banks as (i) larger cash-flow rights by the 
controlling owner boost valuation, and (ii) weak shareholders protection laws lower bank 
valuation. In contrast to Caprio et al. (2007), we focus on impaired loans and capital 
adequacy instead of the value of the bank. Furthermore, our data set is much broader.  
The study that comes closest to the present paper is from Laeven and Levine (2008) who 
assess theories on the relationship between risk taking by banks, their ownership 
structures and national bank regulations. In line with our findings, these authors report 
that ownership concentration affects risk taking, conditional on shareholder protection 
rights and the supervisory environment. However, there are various important differences 
between both studies. First, Laeven and Levine (2008) only consider ownership stakes of 
10 and 20 percent, whereas our results suggest that at higher levels of ownership 
concentration the results may be different. Second, these authors proxy bank risks by the 
so-called Z-score whereas we take the impaired loans ratio and the capital adequacy ratio 
as proxies for risk. Third, Laeven and Levine (2008) use data for some 300 banks 
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 Park and Peristiani (2007) analyze the moral hazard problem in the context of banking firms and examine 
whether bank shareholders have incentives to transfer wealth from the deposit insurer by pursuing riskier 
strategies. These authors show that tighter capital rules and more rigorous supervision reduce moral hazard 
incentives in the banking system. 
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whereas we have a much larger dataset. Finally, we follow Aiken and West (1991) in 
examining interaction effects and do not draw conclusions on the basis of the 
(in)significance of interaction terms.  
The organization of the remainder of this chapter is as follows. Section 5.2 describes 
our model, while section 5.3 discusses the data. Section 5.4 reports the main estimation 
results and the outcomes of a sensitivity analysis. Finally, section 5.5 offers the 
conclusions and discusses some implications of our findings.  
5.2 The Model  
We use two dependent variables: the impaired loans to gross loans ratio and the capital 
adequacy ratio. Both variables may be considered as indicators of bank riskiness.4 The 
impaired loans to gross loans ratio is a standard proxy for a bank's asset risk. The capital 
adequacy ratio plays a central role in the international bank solvency standards of the 
Basel Committee of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and is a proxy for bank 
capitalization. Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2006) and Podpiera (2004) show that low 
capitalization implies that the bank is more risky.  
Our explanatory variables are ownership concentration, a proxy for shareholder 
protection, a proxy for supervisory control, and various control variables that have been 
suggested in the literature. As argued in the previous section, shareholder protection and 
supervisory control may condition the effect of ownership concentration and we therefore 
include various interaction terms.5  
Our control variables include (i) cost/income ratio, as a proxy for bank efficiency; 
(ii) bank size (measured by equity), as small banks can behave differently from large 
                                                 
4
 Both variables arguably compensate each other. A bank with a higher asset risk should have a higher 
capital ratio. However, if a bank's impaired loans ratio goes up and the bank does not respond by attracting 
new capital, the capital ratio will decline.  
5
 In some corporate finance studies, ownership concentration is considered endogenous to firm value. 
However, we do not consider this to be a problem for our model because of three reasons. First, ownership 
patterns of firms are generally stable over time and depend on particular histories of corporations (La Porta, 
2002). Second, our variables of interest are not bank valuation as such. We assume that loan quality and 
capital adequacy will be directly reflected in banking spreads. Third, bank balance sheets are considered 
quite opaque. So, we expect that the effect of loan losses and capital adequacy on the choice of ownership 
concentration will be very marginal, if any. 
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banks; (iii) activities restrictions, following Boyd et al. (1998)6, (iv) loan growth as a 
proxy for a bank’s growth opportunities (Caprio et al., 2007);  (v) bank concentration, as 
a proxy for competition in the banking system (Beck et al., 2006); (vi) a dummy 
indicating whether the bank is listed or not (Iannotta et al., 2007)7; and (vii) income per 
capita of the country in which the bank is located (Beck et al., 2006).  So our model is: 
 
Qij =  β0 + β1 (OCij )+ β2(SPRi ) + β3 (OCij*SPRi ) + β4 (SCi ) + β5 (OCij* SCi) + β6 (SPRi *SCi) + 
β7 (OCij*SPRi * SCi) +β8 (Efficiencyij) + β9 (Sizeij) +  β10 (Activities Restrictionsi ) + β11 (Loan 
Growthij) + β12 (Concentrationi) +β13 (Listedi) + β14 (GDP per capitaj) (5.1) 
 
Where Qij is the dependent variable (i.e., the impaired loans to gross loans ratio or the 
capital adequacy ratio) of bank i in country j, OC is an indicator of bank ownership 
concentration, SPR is our proxy for shareholder protection rights, SC is a proxy for 
supervisory control, Efficiency is the cost to income ratio as proxy for managerial 
efficiency, Size is an indicator of bank size, Loan Growth is an indicator of loan growth, 
Activities Restrictions is an indicator showing the extent to which banks are allowed to 
have various activities, Concentration is an indicator of the concentration in the banking 
industry, Listed is a dummy indicating whether the bank is listed, and GDP per capita is 
income per capita of the country in which the bank is located. Table 5.1 gives the sources 
of the data and shows the expected signs of the variables used.  
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 According to Boyd et al. (1998), allowing banks to diversify their activities improves their profitability 
but also increases risk-taking behavior.   
7
 According to Iannotta et al. (2007), listed banks may face different monitoring and pressure on the 




Table 5.1. Data Sources and Expected Signs 
Dependent variables: Expected Sign: Data Source: 
Impaired Loans/Gross Loans      Bankscope 
Risk-Weighted Capital Adequacy     Bankscope 
 Explanatory variables: 
Impaired Loans/ Gross 
Loans Ratio 
Capital Adequacy 
Ratio   
Ownership Concentration (OC) Positive/ Negative Positive/ Negative Bankscope 
Shareholder Protection Rights (SPR) Negative Positive 
Djankov et al. 
(2008) 
Supervisory Control (SC) Negative Positive Barth et al. (2001) 
Cost/ Income (Efficiency) Positive Positive/ Negative Bankscope 
Bank Equity (Size) Negative Positive Bankscope 
Activities Restrictions  Positive Positive/ Negative Barth et al. (2001) 
Loan Growth  Negative Positive Bankscope 
Bank Concentration  Positive Positive/ Negative Beck et al. (2000) 
Listed Bank Positive/Negative Positive/ Negative Bankscope 
GDP per capita Negative Positive 
World Development 
Indicators of the 
World Bank 
 
5.3 Data Description 
Our data on bank ownership concentration come from Bureau Van Dijk’s Bankscope 
database. This indicator characterizes the degree of independence of a company with 
regard to its shareholders. We collected data for all banking companies for 2005-2007 as 
reported in the December 2008 version of the Bankscope database. The sample used in 
the empirical analysis consists of around 500 banks from more than 50 countries. Table 
5.2 shows the distribution of banks according to ownership. Almost two thirds of the 
banks in our sample have an owner with more than 50 percent shareholding. 
Furthermore, 8 percent of the banks had no shareholder with more than 10 percent 
ownership stake; 14 percent had one or more owners with more than 10 percent of the 
shares, but none of them had more than 25 percent of the shares, and 8 percent of the 
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banks had one or more shareholders with at least 25 percent of the shares but less than 50 
percent.  
Table 5.2 Distribution of Ownership Concentration  
COUNTRY Less than 10% 10 - 25 % 25 -50% More than 50 % 
ARGENTINA 0.00 0.13 0.06 0.81 
AUSTRALIA 0.07 0.43 0.00 0.50 
AUSTRIA 0.03 0.05 0.28 0.64 
BELGIUM 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.92 
BRAZIL 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.92 
BULGARIA 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
CANADA 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
CHILE 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.67 
CHINA-PEOPLE'S R 0.16 0.44 0.08 0.32 
COLOMBIA 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
CROATIA 0.00 0.17 0.25 0.58 
CZECH REPUBLIC 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
DENMARK 0.38 0.06 0.25 0.31 
ECUADOR 0.09 0.00 0.27 0.64 
EGYPT 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
EL SALVADOR 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
FINLAND 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.33 
FRANCE 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.88 
GERMANY 0.00 0.08 0.18 0.74 
GHANA 0.25 0.08 0.17 0.50 
GREECE 0.08 0.23 0.31 0.38 
HONG KONG 0.00 0.08 0.04 0.88 
HUNGARY 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
ICELAND 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.50 
INDIA 0.06 0.13 0.19 0.63 
INDONESIA 0.00 0.00 0.22 0.78 
IRELAND 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.82 
ITALY 0.06 0.08 0.13 0.73 
JAMAICA 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
JAPAN 0.11 0.00 0.22 0.67 
KAZAKHSTAN 0.20 0.20 0.00 0.60 
KENYA 0.00 0.43 0.00 0.57 
KOREA REP. OF 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.50 
LATVIA 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.91 
LUXEMBOURG 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.94 
MALAYSIA 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
MEXICO 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
MOROCCO 0.00 0.00 0.60 0.40 
NETHERLANDS 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.93 
NEW ZEALAND 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
NIGERIA 0.29 0.57 0.00 0.14 
NORWAY 0.00 0.33 0.33 0.33 
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PAKISTAN 0.00 0.36 0.27 0.36 
PANAMA 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.87 
PHILIPPINES 0.00 0.31 0.50 0.19 
POLAND 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
PORTUGAL 0.09 0.00 0.09 0.82 
ROMANIA 0.00 0.13 0.13 0.75 
RUSSIAN FEDERATION 0.12 0.39 0.06 0.43 
SINGAPORE 0.00 0.17 0.17 0.67 
SLOVAKIA 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.67 
SOUTH AFRICA 0.00 0.08 0.15 0.77 
SPAIN 0.22 0.22 0.05 0.51 
SRI LANKA 0.00 0.33 0.33 0.33 
SWEDEN 0.00 0.25 0.25 0.50 
SWITZERLAND 0.08 0.04 0.00 0.88 
TAIWAN 0.38 0.38 0.00 0.25 
THAILAND 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.50 
TUNISIA 0.08 0.25 0.25 0.42 
TURKEY 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
UGANDA 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
UKRAINE 0.09 0.18 0.00 0.73 
UNITED KINGDOM 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.95 
URUGUAY 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.95 
USA 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.83 
VENEZUELA 0.11 0.11 0.00 0.78 
ZIMBABWE 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.80 
Total 0.08 0.14 0.08 0.70 
 
In our empirical analysis we employ three indicators of ownership concentration. 
Ownership concentration 1 is a dummy that is one in case there is at least one owner with 
shareholdings greater than 10 percent and zero otherwise. Ownership concentration 2 is a 
dummy that is one in case there is at least one owner with shareholdings above 25 percent 
and zero otherwise. Ownership concentration 3 is a dummy that is one in case there is a 
controlling owner with more than 50 percent of the shares and zero otherwise.8  
From the Bankscope database we also obtained the impaired loans to gross loans 
ratio, the capital adequacy measure, the cost to income ratio (our proxy for efficiency), 
equity (our proxy for size), and loan growth. The capital adequacy measure is Tier 1 
                                                 
8
 Although it is quite common to use a threshold of 10 percent ownership, under two important accounting 
standards, i.e., the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and the US Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (US GAAP), inter-corporate ownership less than 20 percent is considered as 
minority passive shareholding. Similarly, an ownership stake greater than 20 percent but less than 50 
percent is considered to be minority active, and only ownership of more than 50 percent is considered to be 
a controlling stake. 
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capital (i.e., the shareholder funds plus perpetual non-cumulative preference shares) as a 
percentage of risk-weighted assets and off balance sheet risks as measured under the 
Basel rules. The cost to income ratio measures overhead costs, mainly consisting of 
salaries.  
Our indicator of shareholders protection (SPR) is derived from Djankov et al. 
(2008), who recently updated the study of La Porta et al. (2002). This indicator includes 
legal provisions, like cumulative voting or proportional representation of minorities on 
the board of directors, presence of oppressed minorities mechanism, and proxy votes by 
mail. It has a scale from 1 (low protection) to 5 (high protection).  
We use data on bank concentration from the World Bank’s 2007 Database on 
Financial Development and Structure. The bank concentration variable used represents 
the assets of the three largest banks as a percentage of the assets of all commercial banks 
in the country concerned.  
Finally, we calculate variables measuring activities restrictions and supervisory 
control from the World Bank’s 2007 Regulation and Supervision database. As to 
activities restrictions (AR), we consider the conditions under which banks can engage in 
(i) securities activities, (ii) insurance activities, and (iii) real estate activities. The variable 
ranges from 1 (unrestricted) to 4 (each of the activities is prohibited).  
We combine two indicators to construct our proxy for the supervisory regime 
(Control). The first indicator refers to supervisory agency control and is the total number 
of affirmative answers to the following questions: (i) is an external audit a compulsory 
obligation for banks?; (ii) can the supervisory authority force a bank to change its internal 
organizational structure?; (iii) can the supervisory agency legally declare that a bank is 
insolvent?; (iv) can the supervisory authority intervene and suspend some or all 
ownership rights of a problem bank?; (v) can the supervisory agency supersede 
shareholders rights?; (vi) can the supervisory agency remove and replace management?; 
(vii) can the supervisory agency remove and replace directors? (viii) is the minimum 
capital adequacy requirement greater than 8 percent?; (ix) can the supervisory authority 
ask banks to increase minimum required capital in the face of higher credit risk?; (x) can 
the supervisory authority can banks to increase minimum required capital in the face of 
higher market risk?; and (xi) can the supervisory authority ask banks to increase 
Chapter 5 
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minimum required capital in the face of higher operational risk? The second indicator of 
the supervisory regime measures deposit insurance agency control and is the total number 
of affirmative answers to the following questions: (i) can the deposit insurance agency 
legally declare that a bank is insolvent?; (ii) can the deposit insurance agency intervene 
and suspend some or all ownership rights of a problem bank?; (iii) can the deposit 
insurance agency supersede shareholders rights?; (iv) can the deposit insurance agency 
remove and replace management?; and (v) can the deposit insurance agency remove and 
replace directors? We aggregate the supervisory control and insurance agency control 
indicators to construct the regulatory control variable.  
In our analysis, we average data on impaired loans to gross loans ratio, risk-
weighted capital, equity, cost to income ratio, and bank concentration for the period 2005 
to 2007 in order to cancel out short-term fluctuations. Table 5.3 shows the summary 
statistics of our key variables used, while Table D1 in Appendix D shows the correlation 
matrix.  
 
Table 5.3 Summary Statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Impaired Loans/Gross Loans  755 3.32 5.34 0.00 85.81
Risk-Weighted Capital Adequacy 518 15.21 11.22 -30.83 79.97
Ownership Level 1 (Threshold 10%) 2255 0.94 0.23 0.00 1.00
Ownership Level 2 (Threshold 25%) 2255 0.57 0.49 0.00 1.00
Ownership Level 3 (Threshold 50%) 2255 0.48 0.50 0.00 1.00
Shareholder Protection Rights (SPR) 1914 3.33 1.00 1.00 5.00
Supervisory Control (SC) 1851 8.83 2.91 2.00 13.00
Cost/Income (Efficiency) 1412 63.10 34.48 0.00 578.98
Bank Equity (Size) (in US $ 100,000) 1424 0.32 3.56 0.00 112.01
Activities Restrictions 2038 7.23 1.79 3.00 12.00
Loan Growth 1369 0.15 1.34 -1.51 39.66
Bank Concentration 2196 0.51 0.23 0.18 1.00
Listed Bank 2255 0.19 0.40 0.00 1.00
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5.4 Empirical Results 
We estimate a country random effects model. The use of a fixed effects model is not 
feasible here because many variables like shareholder protection rights, supervisory 
control environment, bank concentration and per capita income are the same for all banks 
in a country. Our main results are shown in Table D2 in Appendix D.  
In the model for the capital adequacy ratio the coefficients of the control variables 
have the expected signs, except for the dummy for listed banks. Banks with more growth 
potential (proxied by loan growth) have higher capital adequacy ratios. The coefficient is 
significant at the 1 percent significance level. The coefficient of the cost to income ratio 
is negative, implying that banks with lower managerial efficiency have lower capital 
adequacy ratios. However, the coefficient is only significant at the 10 percent level. 
Surprisingly, listed banks appear to have lower capital adequacy ratios; this finding is 
significant at the 1 percent significance level. The model appears significant at the 1 
percent level of significance according to the Wald Chi-square test. Moreover, it also 
explains more than 30 percent of the variation in the data.  
The model for the impaired loans ratio is significant at the one percent 
significance level as indicated by the Wald chi-square test. All variables have the 
expected sign. However, the only variable that appears significant after controlling for 
our main variables is the proxy for activities restrictions. It comes up with a positive sign, 
which indicates that banks that face more restrictions are more risk-taking, which results 
in lower asset quality. 
Before we turn to the results regarding the impact of ownership concentration, it 
is important to note that inference cannot be based on simple t-statistics because model 
parameters do not provide substantial information in case of models with multiplicative 
terms (Brambor et al., 2006). Looking at our results without the correct treatment of 
interaction terms would suggest that ownership does not matter. However, this is a 
deceptive finding. As Aiken and West (1991) point out, in interactive models we need to 
take the derivative of the model with respect to the variable of interest and evaluate its 
effect on the means of other constituent terms of the derivative. Our key hypotheses 
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relate to the significance of the marginal effect of ownership concentration on our 
dependent variables. So, we are interested in testing the hypotheses that   
H0: β1+ β3 (SPRi ) + β5 (SCi) + β7 (SPRi * SCi)  = 0 
H1: β1+ β3 (SPRi ) + β5 (SCi) + β7 SPRi * SCi)  ≠ 0 
where SPR and SC are average shareholder protection rights and supervisory control 
regime, respectively. Rejection of the null hypothesis implies that ownership 
concentration affects the impaired loans to gross loans ratio or the capital adequacy ratio. 
In order to assess the significance of the variables of interest, we need to draw confidence 
intervals, for which standard errors can be calculated following the methodology of 
Aiken and West (1991).  
 
5.4.1 Results for the capital adequacy ratio  
The basic objective of the paper is to compare banks without shareholders with 
significant control with banks that do have shareholders with significant control. As 
pointed out in the previous section, we employ three dummies indicating ownership 
concentration. The marginal effects and confidence intervals (at a 5 percent significance 
level) are shown in Figure 5.1. The upper panel shows the marginal effect of ownership 
concentration on the capital adequacy ratio at different levels of shareholder protection 
rights. The bottom panel of Figure 5.1 shows the same marginal effect conditional on 
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Figure 5.1 Marginal Effect of Ownership Concentration  
on Capital Adequacy Ratio 
 
This figure examines the impact of ownership concentration on capital adequacy ratio and corresponds to our main 
results as given in Table D2 in Appendix D.  The upper panel examines the marginal effect of ownership concentration 
at different levels of shareholder protection and the lower panel examines the same at different supervisory control 
levels. The left graphs in upper and lower panel pertain to model 1 where we examine the impact of ownership 
concentration greater than 10 percent. The middle graphs correspond to model 2 examining the impact of ownership 
greater than 25 percent and the right graphs represent the ownership concentration greater than 50 percent.  
 
Let us start with the results in case we assume that there is concentrated 
ownership when one or more shareholders own 10 percent of the bank’s shares 
(ownership level 1). As Figure 5.1 shows, ownership concentration has no significant 
impact on the capital adequacy ratio when we use this 10 percent cut-off point of control. 
The same result shows up if ownership concentration is defined using a 25 percent 
ownership stake (ownership level 2). However, if ownership concentration is defined 
using a 50 percent threshold (ownership level 3) it has a significant and positive effect on 
the capital adequacy ratio. Moreover, Figure 5.1 also shows that as shareholder protection 
improves the effect of ownership concentration becomes positive. However, as 
supervisory control increases the impact reduces. This is in line with the view of Demsetz 





























































regulation leads to more effective disciplining of managers and this, in turn, reduces the 
benefits of ownership control. So ownership concentration matters less when regulatory 
control is stronger.  
5.4.2 Results for the impaired loans ratio 
The results for the marginal impact of ownership concentration on the impaired loans 
ratio, conditional on shareholder protection rights and the supervisory control, are shown 
in Figure 5.2. The results for Ownership concentration level 1 show a positive impact of 
ownership concentration on non-performing loans. However, there is a negative impact 
of ownership concentration on impaired loans when concentration is defined using cut-
off points of 25% and 50% (level 2 and level 3 ownership, respectively), although it is 
only significant for the latter. This suggests that when concentration exceeds 10 percent, 
ownership concentration increases the volume of non-performing loans. However, when 
it is above 50 percent, ownership concentration reduces the volume of non-performing 
loans. These results indicate that when two or three shareholders have blocks of 
ownership, the quality of the portfolio of the bank may deteriorate for the reasons 
explained by Gomes and Novaes (1999, 2005). In contrast, when there is one controlling 
owner, the monitoring of the bank’s management is more efficient, leading to a lower 
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Figure 5.2 Marginal Effect of Ownership Concentration  
On Impaired Loans to Gross Loans Ratio 
 
This figure examines the impact of ownership concentration on impaired loans to gross loans ratio and corresponds to 
our main results as given in Table D2 in Appendix D.  The upper panel examines the marginal effect of ownership 
concentration at different levels of shareholder protection and the lower panel examines the same at different 
supervisory control levels. The left graphs in upper and lower panel pertain to model 1 where we examine the impact of 
ownership concentration greater than 10 percent. The middle graphs correspond to model 2 examining the impact of 
ownership greater than 25 percent and the right graphs represent the ownership concentration greater than 50 percent.  
 
Another important finding that follows from the lower panel of Figure 5.2 is that 
in case of weaker supervisory control the impact of controlling ownership concentration 
is negative and significant. This result is in line with the view of Demsetz and Lehen 
(1985). Furthermore, our results suggest that with higher levels of supervisory control the 
impact of ownership concentration is not significant, but in the case of a poorer 
supervisory control regime the impact can be negative and significant.  
5.4.3 Sensitivity analysis 
To check whether our results are robust, we (i) applied our analysis to non-OECD banks 
only, and (ii) used five-year averages instead of three-year averages. The use of only non-
























































model as indicated by the R-squared is higher. All interaction terms and marginal effects 
retain their signs. Similarly, the use of five-year instead of three-year averages does not 
affect our main conclusions (results available on request).  
Finally, we have taken the type of ownership into account as this may matter 
(Ianotta et al., 2007). However, it turned out that more than two thirds of the fully owned 
firms in our sample were held by some kind of banking conglomerate, while other types 
of ownership (like government ownership) were less represented in our sample. 
Furthermore, it turned out that when a bank is owned by a banking conglomerate the 
latter very often has more than 50 percent of the shares of the bank. Including a dummy 
for ownership by a bank holding company in our model would therefore imply a high 
degree of collinearity with one of our ownership concentration variables. We therefore 
decided to re-estimate our model dropping all banks that are not owned by a banking 
conglomerate.9 
The estimation results are shown in Table D3 in Appendix D, accompanied by 
Figures 5.3 and 5.4, which are congruent with Figures 5.1 and 5.2. The two figures reveal 









                                                 
9
 Estimating the model for those observations that were dropped does not make sense, in view of the 
sample size. 
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Figure 5.3 Marginal effect of Ownership Concentration  
on Capital Adequacy Ratio Controlling for Ownership Type 
 
This figure examines the impact of ownership concentration on capital adequacy ratio and corresponds to our 
sensitivity results as given in Table D3 in Appendix D.  The upper panel examines the marginal effect of ownership 
concentration at different levels of shareholder protection and the lower panel examines the same at different 
supervisory control levels. The left graphs in upper and lower panel pertain to model 1 where we examine the impact of 
ownership concentration greater than 10 percent. The middle graphs correspond to model 2 examining the impact of 






























































Figure 5.4 Marginal effect of Ownership Concentration  
on Impaired Loans to Gross Loans Ratio Controlling for Ownership Type 
 
This figure examines the impact of ownership concentration on impaired loans to gross loans ratio and corresponds to 
our sensitivity results as given in Table D3 in Appendix D.  The upper panel examines the marginal effect of ownership 
concentration at different levels of shareholder protection and the lower panel examines the same at different 
supervisory control levels. The left graphs in upper and lower panel pertain to model 1 where we examine the impact of 
ownership concentration greater than 10 percent. The middle graphs correspond to model 2 examining the impact of 
ownership greater than 25 percent and the two right graphs represent the ownership concentration greater than 50 
percent.  
 
5.5 Conclusions and Policy Implications  
We examine the effect of ownership concentration on impaired loans and capital 
adequacy ratios for a sample of about 800 banks from 50 countries. We find that 
ownership concentration significantly affects loan quality and bank capitalization, 
although the results sometimes differ depending on the definition of ownership 
concentration used. As for the capital adequacy ratio, the effect of ownership 
concentration is positive and results in a better risk-weighted capitalization, while its 
effect is negative on the non-performing loans ratio at least if ownership is above 50 
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who argue that ownership concentration matters less in regulated firms, like banks. 
However, an important extension to their theory is the level of supervisory control as our 
results suggest that in case of weak supervisory control, ownership concentration matters. 
Moreover, our findings tend to support the Berle-Means (1933) view that ownership 
concentration is to be associated with superior firm performance. Furthermore, it turns 
out that shareholder protection matters as suggested by Shleifer and Vishny (1997): with 
limited shareholders protection rights, the impact of dispersed ownership is insignificant 
for the capital adequacy ratio, but when protection and/or regulatory control are weak 
ownership concentration becomes significant.  
 Our findings may also be relevant for policymakers. First, it is important for 
supervisors to consider the different impact that their policies may have on banking firms 
subject to their ownership pattern. Second, our results indicate that when shareholders 
protection rights are weak, ownership concentration is beneficial for the banking firm. It 
can compensate for lower shareholder protection and, given a satisfactory level of 
supervisory control, ownership concentration improves bank performance. Finally, 
attention needs to be paid to the impact of multiple shareholders with none of them 
having a controlling stake. Our results suggest that this kind of banks can be a victim of 
sub-optimal bargaining problems as suggested by Gomes and Novaes (1999, 2005). The 
design of control mechanism for such special banks should be considered in policy 
design. 
 
